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WTO RECOURSE FOR RECLAMATION IRRIGATION
SUBSIDIES: UNDERMARKET WATER PRICES AS FOREGONE
REVENUE
Paul Stanton Kibel*
There are competing demands for fresh water. Farms look to it as an
irrigation source, cities rely on it for drinking water, and fisheries (and
fishermen) depend on it for instream flow. When the United States
Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”) subsidizes the costs of
providing fresh water for irrigation in agricultural production, such
subsidization can result in tiered water pricing. With tiered pricing,
farms pay the government less per unit than other water users. This
tiered pricing can distort the water marketplace in a manner that
encourages wasteful irrigation practices and leaves insufficient water
instream for fisheries. The dispute over Reclamation irrigation subsidies
may now be moving from the domestic to the international arena. The
1994 World Trade Organization Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (“WTO Subsidies Agreement”) provides that
one WTO member country may impose countervailing measures against
another WTO member country that makes a “financial contribution”
that is specific to “certain enterprises.”1 The WTO Subsidies Agreement
further provides that “government revenue . . . otherwise due [that] is
forgone” can qualify as a “financial contribution” and that governments
must be paid “adequate remuneration” for goods provided.2 This article
assesses the potential applicability of the WTO Subsidies Agreement’s
foregone revenue and adequate remuneration provisions to Reclamation
irrigation subsidies, with an initial focus on such applicability to
Reclamation’s Central Valley Project (“CVP”) in California.

*
Professor, Golden Gate University (“GGU”) School of Law, San Francisco, California, and
Co-Director, GGU Center on Urban Environmental Law (“CUEL”). LL.M., Boalt Hall Law
School, University of California at Berkeley, B.A. Colgate University. This article expands on
papers the author delivered at the World Water Congress in Recife, Brazil (September 2011) and
at the California Water Law Symposium in Berkeley, California (January 2012). The author
thanks Patrick Voos (GGU Law LL.M, 2011) and Millay Kogan (GGU Law J.D., 2011) for
research assistance related to this article.
1 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures arts. 1, 2, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14
[hereinafter Agreement on Subsidies].
2 Agreement on Subsidies arts. 1.1, 14.
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In the arid west of the United States in the early 1900s, the chief
constraint on agriculture was the scarcity of freshwater resources.3 In

3 ROBERT DE ROOS, THE THIRSTY LAND: THE STORY OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT 3
(1948) (“But the tough, basic, all-important problem is water. California is a semiarid state.
Without water it is not much. Water is its life force. Water is the limiting factor in the growth of
its great cities and in the productivity of its land . . . . California’s great struggle in its fight for
growth and prosperity is to find ways to use every drop of the available water, to allow none to go
waste.”); see also The Bureau of Reclamation: A Very Brief History, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, http://www.usbr.gov/history/borhist.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) [hereinafter The
Bureau of Reclamation].
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many areas of the western United States, rainfall is inadequate for dry
farming.4 In recognition that the creation of large scale works for the
storage and delivery of water was necessary to put more of the lands of
the arid west into agricultural production, Congress enacted the
Reclamation Act in 1902.5 The 1902 Reclamation Act created the
United States Reclamation Service, which was renamed the United
States Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”) in 1923.6
The portfolio of Reclamation irrigation projects in the arid west is
extensive. The portfolio includes: the Rio Grande Project in New
Mexico (comprising Caballo Dam, Elephant Butte Dam, Percha
Diversion Dam, Leasburg Diversion Dam, Mesilla Diversion Dam,
American Diversion Dam and Riverside Diversion Dam);7 the Salt
River Project in Arizona (comprising Theodore Roosevelt Dam, Horse
Mesa Dam, Mormom Flat Dam, Stewart Mountain Dam, Bartlett Dam
and Hoseshoe Dam);8 the Boulder Canyon Project in Arizona and
Nevada (comprising Hoover Dam);9 the Newlands Project in Nevada
(comprising Lake Tahoe Dam, Lahontan Dam, Carson River Diversion
Dam and the Derby Diversion Dam);10 the Parker-Davis Project in
California (comprising Parker Dam and Davis Dam);11 and the Central
Valley Project in California (comprising Shasta Dam, Friant Dam,
Folsom Dam, Contra Loma Dam, Martinez Dam, Franchi Dam and San
Luis Dam).12
Of these projects, the Central Valley Project (“CVP”) in California is
the largest irrigation water supply project constructed and operated by
Reclamation.13 Construction of the CVP began in the late 1930s,14 but
The Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 3.
Id.; Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388.
6 The Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 3.
7 Rio Grande Project, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.js
p?proj_Name=Rio+Grande+Project (last updated May 16, 2011).
8 Salt River Project, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.js
p?proj_Name=Salt+River+Project (last updated Aug. 19, 2011).
9 Boulder Canyon Project-Hoover Dam, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.usbr.gov
/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Boulder+Canyon+Project+-+Hoover+Dam (last updated Feb. 1,
2012).
10 Newlands Project, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.js
p?proj_Name=Newlands+Project (last updated May 11, 2011).
11 Parker-Davis Project, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.
jsp?proj_Name=Parker-Davis%20Project (last updated May 11, 2011).
12 Central Valley Project, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.usbr.gov/projects/Projec
t.jsp?proj_Name=Central+Valley+Project (last updated Mar. 15, 2013).
13 CHRIS EDWARDS & PETER J. HILL, CUTTING THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION AND
REFORMING WATER MARKETS 5 (2012), available at http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/
sites/downsizinggovernment.org/files/pdf/interior-cutting-bureau-reclamation.pdf.
4
5
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the project has grown to include twenty dams with a combined storage
capacity of approximately eleven million acre feet (“AF”) and
approximately 500 miles of canals and aqueducts.15 Although a small
percentage of CVP water is delivered to municipal water agencies, the
vast majority of CVP water is delivered to contractors for agricultural
irrigation.16 Most of the CVP irrigation water is provided to large-scale
agricultural operations in the San Joaquin Valley in particular and to a
lesser extent in the Sacramento Valley.17 Collectively, the San Joaquin
Valley and the Sacramento Valley comprise what is commonly referred
to as California’s Central Valley, which stretches vertically from the
city of Bakersfield in the south to the city of Redding in the north.
In addition to agricultural and municipal uses, some CVP water is
also left instream to provide habitat to sustain salmon, steelhead trout
and smelt.18 This instream use is sometimes accomplished through
purchases from Reclamation of CVP water via the Environmental Water
Account (“EWA”), a governmental entity established in the 1990s to
help restore declining fisheries.19
Reclamation establishes the price for delivery of CVP irrigation
water through long-term water delivery contracts. The contract prices
set by Reclamation for delivery of irrigation water have been and
remain well below the prices necessary for Reclamation to recoup its
initial construction costs or cover ongoing operation and maintenance
(“O&M”) costs.20 Moreover, the price paid by Central Valley farmers
for CVP water is much less than the price paid by California cities for
CVP water, and much less than the price paid by the EWA for CVP
water to remain instream.21 The CVP’s tiered pricing has enabled
California farms to maintain a secure supply of inexpensive irrigation
from the federal government, which has facilitated the planting of such

14 Eric A. Stene, The Central Valley Project, Introduction, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
http://www.usbr.gov/history/cvpintro.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
15 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, OVERVIEW ON CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT FINANCING, COST
ALLOCATION, AND REPAYMENT ISSUES 4 (2008), available at http://deltavision.ca.gov/Consulta
ntReports/CVP_Financing_and_Repayment_Summary_9-18-08.pdf.
16 Id. at 16.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 4; PAT BRANDES & JIM WHITE, ENVIRONMENTAL WATER ACCOUNT EXPENDITURES
FOR CHINOOK SALMON IN WATER YEAR 2005 (2005), available at http://www.science.calwater.
ca.gov/pdf/ewa/EWA_Brandes_Salmon_Actions_113005.pdf.
19 California Water Subsidies: Findings, ENVTL. WORKING GRP. (Dec. 15, 2004),
http://www.ewg.org/research/california-water-subsidies/findings [hereinafter California Water
Subsidies: Findings].
20 Id.
21 Id.
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water intensive crops as alfalfa and cotton in the Central Valley and has
also provided incentives to grow crops on lands that are only marginally
suited for farming due to poor drainage conditions.22
Reclamation’s undermarket irrigation pricing in general, and CVP
subsidization of irrigation for Central Valley farms in particular, has
been the subject of domestic criticism in the United States (and attempts
at domestic reform) for several decades.23 Some of this domestic
criticism has come from free market advocacy groups generally
associated with the political right.24 For instance, in 2012, the
conservative Cato Institute released a paper titled Cutting the Bureau of
Reclamation and Reforming Water Markets, which noted:
The CVP is Reclamation’s largest irrigation project, providing
roughly 6,800 farmers irrigation water for about 3 million acres
of land. The farmers receive the water at roughly 10 percent of
its market value, which in 2002 worked out to an annual subsidy
of about $416 million a year . . . Who benefits from all these
federal subsidies? Generally, it’s a small number of large farm
businesses and landowners. In the CVP the subsidies are heavily
slanted toward the largest farms. The largest 10 percent of farms
(roughly 700 farms) in the CVP receive about two-thirds of the
project’s entire water supply. . . . Thus, to a substantial extent,
subsidized irrigation farming in the West is “corporate welfare,”
which comes at the expense of average taxpayers, citizens, and
the environment.25

Beyond the CVP critiques focused on the large agribusiness interests
that receive the lion-share of project water, there have been other
critiques as well.
Domestic criticism of Reclamation and CVP irrigation pricing has
also come from fishery conservation and environmental groups
generally associated with the political left, who have focused on how
Reclamation’s CVP freshwater diversions have adversely impacted
California’s native fisheries by reducing instream flow, and how
undermarket Reclamation CVP irrigation pricing has led to the farming
of lands without adequate drainage. For instance, in a 2004 report titled
California Water Subsidies, the Environmental Working Group found:

22
23
24
25

Id.
Id.
EDWARDS & HILL, supra note 13, at 5–6.
Id.
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By allowing the planting of water-intensive crops such as rice,
cotton and alfalfa in what is naturally a desert, [the CVP] has
discouraged the efficient use of water.
....
This inefficiency means less water for wildlife and urban users.
Wildlife in particular has paid the price. Of 29 fish species
native to the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and the BayDelta, two are extinct, six are endangered, five are rare and nine
others are declining.
Cheap water has also made feasible the continued farming of
land unsuited for irrigation because of serious drainage and
toxicity problems. One of the worst environmental disasters in
the state’s history, the mass death of migratory birds at the
Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge in Merced County, was the
result of toxic salts in the soil carried downstream by irrigation
runoff.26

Urban water users, who are less closely aligned with either the
political left or the political right, have also criticized Reclamation
irrigation pricing. In the 2013 edition of their book Legal Control of
Water Resources, Professors Barton Thompson, John Leshy and Robert
Abrams observed: “City residents have wondered why they are paying
several hundreds of dollars per acre foot for their water while most
farmers are paying water rates in the double digits.”27
Beyond the domestic criticism, an international trade dimension is
now also emerging in the debate over Reclamation irrigation subsidies.28
The 1994 conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) resulted in the creation of
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and the adoption of the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“WTO
Subsidies Agreement”).29 The WTO Subsidies Agreement establishes
what is referred to as a “traffic light” system, which categorizes
subsidies as either permitted subsidies (green light), prohibited subsidies

26 California Water Subsidies: Findings, supra note 19; see also Lloyd G. Carter, Reaping
Riches in a Wretched Region: Subsidized Industrial Farming and Its Link to Perpetual Poverty, 3
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 19–13 (2009).
27 BARTON H. THOMPSON, JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT H. ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF
WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 837 (West 5th ed. 2013).
28 See Richard Steinberg & Timothy E. Josling, When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of
EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge, 6 INT’L ECON. L. 369 (2003).
29 MARC BENITAH, THE LAW OF SUBSIDIES UNDER THE GATT/WTO SYSTEM 2–3 (Kluwer
Law Int’t ed., 2001); see generally Agreement on Subsidies.
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(red light) or actionable subsidies (amber light).30 Amber
light/actionable subsidies may be lawfully maintained by a WTO
member country, but other WTO member countries may be entitled to
impose “countervailing” measures if they can show evidence of injury.31
Such countervailing measures might include equivalent tariffs imposed
on the import of goods from the country maintaining the actionable
subsidy (tariffs equivalent to offset the injury caused by the subsidy).32
Under the WTO Subsidies Agreement, the category of actionable
subsidies includes “government revenue . . . otherwise due [that] is
foregone” or government provision of goods and services without
“adequate remuneration.”33 Thus, foregone revenue or inadequate
remuneration by a WTO member government may qualify as an
actionable subsidy exposing such country to the imposition of
countervailing tariffs by other injured WTO member countries.34
The question explored in this article is whether Reclamation’s
undermarket prices for irrigation water falls within the scope of the
forgone revenue and adequate remuneration provisions of the WTO
Subsidies Agreement. This broader question, which touches on
Reclamation’s general irrigation price policies and on Reclamation
projects throughout the United States, is approached initially through a
case study of WTO compliance issues pertaining to Reclamation’s CVP
irrigation pricing. The article’s analysis regarding the CVP is then
placed in the context of Reclamation’s national water project portfolio,
with guidance on how the article’s mode of analysis as to CVP WTO
compliance issues might serve as a blueprint for assessing the
applicability of WTO subsidy disciplines to irrigation pricing for other
Reclamation projects.
II. RECLAMATION IRRIGATION PRICING AND THE CENTRAL VALLEY
PROJECT (“CVP”)
In 2008, the Governor of California’s Delta Vision Task Force
released its report on CVP financing and repayment.35 This report began
by setting the geographic and hydrological context, noting:
30 Agreement on Subsidies pts. I–IV; KEVIN KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
REGULATION: READINGS, CASES, NOTES AND PROBLEMS 608 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2009).
31 Agreement on Subsidies art. 11.2.
32 Agreement on Subsidies art. 19.
33 Agreement on Subsidies arts. 1.1(a)(1)(ii), 14; BENITAH, supra note 29, at 47; KENNEDY,
supra note 30, at 609.
34 Agreement on Subsidies art. 19; BENITAH, supra note 29, at 81–82; KENNEDY, supra note
30, at 609.
35 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15.
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California’s Central Valley floor is a 400 mile long alluvial fan.
Water captured in the northern half of the Valley drains into the
Sacramento River and its tributaries, and water captured in the
southern half of the valley drains into the San Joaquin and Tule
Rivers and their respective tributaries. The Sacramento and San
Joaquin Rivers eventually converge into the Sacramento-San
Joaquin Delta (Delta) before reaching the Pacific Ocean at the
Golden Gate Bridge. Precipitation varies significantly from
north to south. The north end of the Valley receives about twothirds of the total Valley precipitation and is prone to severe
flooding[,] while the southern end receives only one-third of the
precipitation (and is prone to drought).”36

The primary purpose of the CVP, initially authorized by the United
States Congress and United States President Franklin Roosevelt in
1935, was to construct and install new water infrastructure (dams,
reservoirs, and canals) that would create new irrigation supplies for
agriculture in the southern end of the valley.37 Main components of CVP
water infrastructure include Shasta Dam on the Sacramento River,
Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River, the Delta Mendota Canal, the
Madera Canal, the Friant Kern Canal, the Delta Cross Channel and the
Tracy Pumping Plant.38
In 1948, Robert de Roos published his book The Thirsty Land: The
Story of the Central Valley Project, which offers an account of the
motivations of early CVP proponents that captures the boosterish tenor
of Reclamation activity during this period:
Nature, which delivers water only during the winter and spring,
provides too much water in Sacramento Valley and not enough
in the San Joaquin. Two-thirds of the rain and snow of northern
California fall in the Sacramento watershed, and the Sacramento
Valley has only one-third of the arable land of the two valleys.
And only one-third of the rain and snow reaches the San Joaquin
Valley, which has two-thirds of the arable land.39

After setting this broader geographic and hydrologic stage, de Roos then
explains the underlying raison d’etre for those that proposed, designed
and built the CVP:
These great dams and canals and the sizable power system have
one objective: to shift water from the Sacramento Valley where
36

Id.

37 DE ROOS, supra note 3, at 8.
38 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE,

supra note 19.
39 DE ROOS, supra note 3, at 4.

supra note 15, at 3; California Water Subsidies: Findings,
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there is too much, to the San Joaquin Valley, where there is too
little. Simply stated, the Central Valley Project is a north-tosouth water exchange. The available water of the San Joaquin
River, which normally flows north into San Francisco Bay and
the sea, is diverted to the dry acres of the southern valley.
Sacramento River water[,] which ordinarily would wash out the
Golden Gate, is shifted to the central San Joaquin Valley to
replace the San Joaquin River water diverted to the south.40

The federal Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (“RPA”) set forth the
initial authority and structure for Reclamation to recover its investment
in constructing, operating and maintaining authorized water projects.41
The RPA provided for Reclamation to enter into long-term “water
service contracts” (often for 40 years) for projects, such as the CVP, that
provided multiple facilities benefiting many contractors.42 Under the
RPA, costs are allocated to and recovered from beneficiaries based on
the amount of water received as measured in “acre feet” (“AF”) of
water.43
The prices charged to Central Valley farmers by Reclamation
pursuant to RPA water delivery contracts, however, fell far short of
such cost recovery.44 The reasons for this shortfall were noted in 2005
by Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder of the Center for International
Environmental Law (“CIEL”).45 In her chapter in the Oxford University
Press book Fresh Water and International Economic Law, BernasconiOsterwalder documented the repayment requirements for Bureau of
Reclamation irrigation projects throughout the American west,
explaining:
In the United States, . . . the federal government is subsidizing
irrigation systems in various ways. It incorporated a two-stage
subsidy in the way its sets water prices for irrigation water.
First, the contractual water prices were based on an irrigator’s
ability to pay, rather than on the actual costs of supplying the
water. Secondly, no interest was charged on the loans to fund
construction costs. Researchers calculated a water subsidy of
40 DE ROOS, supra note 3, at 8.
41 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra

note 15, at 7.
Id.
43 Id.
44 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW FEDERAL POLICIES AFFECT THE ALLOCATION OF WATER
(Aug. 2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/74xx/doc7471/
08-07-waterallocation.pdf; Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Water, Agriculture, and Subsidies
in the International Trading System, in FRESH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
207, 211–12 (Oxford University Press 2005).
45 Bernasoconi-Osterwalder, supra note 44.
42
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nearly $100 million for seventeen projects alone. The annual
irrigation subsidies for the United States from such underpricing
have been estimated at between $2 billion and $2.5 billion.46

Bernasconi-Osterwalder, with special reference to the CVP, continues:
Because water is inexpensive or free, farmers have no incentive
to use water sparingly. Instead, they are encouraged to use
inefficient technology, such as ineffective sprinklers to irrigate
croplands, or to water crops at the time of day when the
temperatures are highest and much of the water is lost to
evaporation. Moreover, by subsidizing irrigation water,
governments sponsor the planting of water demanding crops.
For example, three of the main crops grown in California’s
Central Valley, with a desert-like climate, are water-intensive,
alfalfa, cotton and rice, although these crops require a much
moister climate.47

Similar findings were made in a 2006 paper prepared by the
Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), titled How Federal Policies
Affect the Allocation of Water.48 The 2006 CBO paper reported:
Subsidies by the Bureau of Reclamation have reduced the prices
that irrigators pay for water. In constructing western water
projects, with the original aim of encouraging settlement, the
federal government spent $24.0 billion (in nominal dollars) from
1902 to 2004. Under reclamation law, $19.3 of that is
“reimbursable”—to be repaid by the projects’ beneficiaries.
Irrigators are responsible for 46 percent of the total, with power
users followed by municipal and industrial waters users
responsible for the rest. Determinations by the federal
government that irrigators were not able to pay shifted $2.9
billion of their $8.9 billion debt to other project beneficiaries,
primarily power users. Also, lawmakers, through specific
legislation, and the courts subsequently reclassified $2.7 billion
of irrigators’ debt as nonreimbusrable. As of 2004, irrigators had
repaid $1.3 billion of their remaining $3.3 billion debt.

46 Id.; see also, Coby Graham, From Dam to Dirt: The Need to Revisit the CVPIA and
Promote Public Ownership of CVP Water 7 (2013) (unpublished student paper, Golden Gate
University) (on file with author) (“[I]rrigators are not required to pay interest on the cost of
construction. This means that, as the cost of money increases over time related to the outstanding
debt owed by the contractors, the repayment amount by the irrigators eventually accounts for less
and less of the actual cost of the project, as well as the cost to finance the project.”).
47 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 44, at 212.
48 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW FEDERAL POLICIES AFFECT THE ALLOCATION OF WATER
(Aug. 2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/74xx/doc7471/
08-07-waterallocation.pdf.
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For irrigators, the Bureau of Reclamation bases its water supply
charges on recovering the associated capital costs and operation
and maintenance (O&M) costs for the federal facilities.
Irrigators’ interest-free payments—which are due over a 40- or
50-year period—do not incorporate the opportunity costs of the
federal expenditures. Over a 40-year repayment period at a
borrowing cost of 4 percent annually, the government recovers
only 49 percent of its true cost. In some instances, the
reimbursable costs of existing reclamation projects have yet to
be recovered and water users’ payment may not even cover
O&M costs.49

The 2006 CBO paper continued:
California’s Central Valley Project—the country’s largest water
supply project—began deliveries in 1940 and was completed in
1979. Irrigators are responsible for paying $1.3 million of the
project’s federal construction cost of $3.6 billion (in nominal
dollars). Originally, irrigators had renewable 40-year water
service contracts that provided for water deliveries but not
necessarily for repaying the $1.3 billion by the end of the
contract term. The Bureau of Reclamation intended for the
contract prices to cover only operation and maintenance (O&M)
expenses and a portion of construction costs. However, the
prices were not even sufficient to cover O&M expenses, which
increased over time. Deficits accrued . . . and no payments were
made for construction costs. . . . [A]s of September 30, 2004,
irrigators had met 14.2 percent of their total repayment
obligation.50

The 2012 Cato Institute report, discussed above, echoed these findings,
observing:
One early decision by the Bureau of Reclamation led to large
investment inefficiencies for much of the 20th century. The 1902
legislation state[s] that “charges shall be determined with a view
of returning to the reclamation fund the estimated cost of
construction of the project.” In interpreting this, the Bureau
decided to exclude interest costs, so that project beneficiaries
would be required to pay back only the original project costs
over time. The effect was to greatly reduce the real value of
repayments, thus creating large subsidies on Reclamation
projects51

49
50
51

Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 7.
EDWARDS & HILL, supra note 13, at 3.
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....
Agriculture has received by far the largest subsidies from
Reclamation projects. In calculating repayment requirements,
Reclamation allocates substantial costs related to irrigation to
other project beneficiaries, such as power customers and urban
water customers. Also, a law change in 1939 allowed the bureau
to reduce costs to irrigators on the basis of “ability to pay,”
which has saved farmers billions of dollars over the decades.52

In response to criticisms regarding the lax repayment/cost recovery
terms in the CVP water delivery contracts entered into by Reclamation,
the federal Central Valley Improvement Act (“CVPIA”) was enacted in
1992.53 Although CVPIA resulted in certain changes to the terms of
renewed CVP water delivery contracts, such as reduced duration (down
to 25 years) and periodic price adjustments, research indicates that postCVPIA contracts for CVP irrigation water are still considerably
undermarket.54 For instance, the 2004 Environmental Working Group
report California Water Subsidies (discussed above) found:
[D]epending on how the market value of the water is defined,
CVP farmers are receiving between $60 million and $416
million in water subsidies each year. The first figure [$60
million] represents the subsidy if the water is priced at the
Bureau of Reclamation’s so-called “full cost rate,” which in
practice is much less than the actual full cost of delivering water
to recipients. The higher figure [$416 million] comes from
comparing the average price for CVP water to the estimated
costs of replacement water supplies from proposed dams and
reservoirs on the San Joaquin River. An intermediate figure is
$305 million a year, reflecting the difference between the
average CVP rate and the price paid for CVP water by the
Environmental Water Account, a state-federal joint agency, to
restore fish and wildlife habitat in the Bay Delta.
No matter what market value is used for comparison, the total
subsidy to CVP farmers exceeds the actual amount they paid in
2002, about $48 million. That means CVP water users are

Id. at 4.
Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub L. No. 102-575, tit. XXXIV, 106 Stat. 4600,
4706 (1992); DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15; California Water Subsidies: About the
Central Valley Project, ENVTL. WORKING GRP. (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.ewg.org/research/
california-water-subsidies/about-central-valley-project [hereinafter California Water Subsidies:
About the Central Valley Project].
54 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15; California Water Subsidies: About the Central
Valley Project, supra note 53.
52
53

2014]

WTO Recourse for Reclamation Irrigation Subsidies

271

getting a minimum discount of 55 percent below market value,
ranging up to almost 90 percent, for the water they receive.55

The 2008 report by the Delta Vision Task Force (noted above) also
concluded that Central Valley farmers, particularly those in the San
Joaquin Valley, had failed by a large margin to repay or reimburse their
share of CVP costs:
The CVP provides project water to both irrigation and M&I
[municipal and industrial] contractors in the San Joaquin Valley.
Current San Joaquin Valley capital repayment responsibilities
are $993.2 million, which represents over 77 percent of the total
[CVP] capital costs of nearly $1.3 billion. Irrigators [were]
responsible for $955 million or 96.2 percent of the reimbursable
total and M&I contractors are responsible for the remaining
$38.1 million.
....
As of September 30, 2006, the San Joaquin Valley contractors
had repaid $193.8 million or 19.6 percent of total allocated
costs, leaving net capital costs of $797.7 million to be repaid.
Irrigation contractors had repaid $184.7 million (19.3 percent),
leaving $769.7 million unpaid.56

Irrigation subsidies are sometimes defined using the “cost recovery”
method. This method defines an irrigation subsidy as the net value of
government expenditures that benefit irrigating farmers and the
revenues from water charges paid by the irrigators to the government.57
This calculation of irrigation subsidies under the cost recovery
methodology should take into account that construction of large-scale
water infrastructure projects (like the CVP) can take several years to
complete, so the amount of the underlying government expenditure used
to calculate the extent of subsidies may not be fixed over time.58
The fact that Reclamation’s CVP reservoirs, pumps and canals were
constructed in phases over many decades, and that the prices charged by
Reclamation under CVP water delivery contracts have undergone
changes over time, adds a layer of complexity to the calculation of CVP
irrigation subsidies. As reflected in the research and analysis undertaken
by the Environmental Working Group in 2004 and the Delta Vision
California Water Subsidies: Findings, supra note 19.
DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15, at 15–16.
57 California Water Subsidies: Metholodology, ENVTL. WORKING GRP. (Dec. 15, 2004),
http://www.ewg.org/research/california-water-subsidies/methodology [hereinafter California
Water Subsidies: Methodology].
58 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 44, at 210.
55
56
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Task Force in 2008, however, the complexity of this calculation is not
insurmountable, particularly in the light of the extensive CVP cost and
pricing information that Reclamation is required to publish.59
Whether one relies on the costs-recovery methodology, or whether
one relies on a comparative evaluation of pricing with other markets for
water (such as the prices paid by municipalities or the Environmental
Water Account), there is strong evidentiary support for the conclusion
that Reclamation’s current CVP pricing for irrigation deliveries to
California farms meets standard notions of a subsidy, and that this
irrigation subsidy is substantial in monetary terms.
III. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (“WTO”) RULES ON SUBSIDIES
A. Foregone Revenue Provisions of 1994 WTO Subsidies Agreement
As a result of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations,
in 1994 the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) became the successor
entity to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).60 Prior
to 1994, the term GATT referred both to the underlying GATT treaty, as
well as the ad hoc administrative apparatus that developed to implement
and ensure compliance with the GATT treaty.61 At the time the WTO
was established in 1994, the members to GATT (including the United
States) also entered into a series of other trade-related agreements,
including the WTO Subsidies Agreement.62 The WTO Subsidies
Agreement builds on traditional notions of subsidies, such as the cost
recovery methodology noted above, but also sets forth a unique set of
terminology, requirements, exemptions and remedies.
In terms of general structure, the WTO Subsidies Agreement is based
on what is referred to as a “traffic light” system with three basic
categories of subsidies.63 The first category is “green light” subsidies,
which are permitted.64 The second category is “red light” subsidies,

59 California Water Subsidies: Methodology, supra note 57; DELTA VISION TASK FORCE,
supra note 15, at 12; Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 44, at 210–11; MONA SUR, DINA
AMALI-DEININGER & ARIEL DINAR, WATER-RELATED SUBSIDIES IN AGRICULTURE:
ENVIRONMENTAL AND EQUITY CONSEQUENCES 6–12 (2002).
60 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
61 Marrakesh Agreement art. II(4); BENITAH, supra note 29, at 3.
62 KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 608.
63 Agreement on Subsidies pts. II–IV; BENITAH, supra note 29, at 34–35, 47; KENNEDY, supra
note 30, at 608.
64 Agreement on Subsidies pt. III; BENITAH, supra note 29, at 34; KENNEDY, supra note 30, at
608.
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which are prohibited; members may bring an action before the WTO to
compel a member to discontinue these types of subsidies.65 For
example, certain direct export subsidies are prohibited as red light
subsidies.66 The third category is “amber light” subsidies, which are
“actionable.”67 “Amber light” or “actionable” subsidies can be
maintained by a WTO member country (such as the United States), but
other WTO member countries may be entitled to impose
“countervailing” measures against the country that maintains an
“actionable” subsidy if it can establish that the subsidy caused
“injury.”68 Such countervailing measures might include equivalent
tariffs imposed on the import of goods from the country maintaining the
actionable subsidy (tariffs equal to, and that offset, the injury caused by
the subsidy).69
For example, in 2002 Brazil brought a challenge against the United
States before the WTO alleging violations of the WTO Subsidies
Agreement in regard to cotton produced in the United States.70 Among
other things, Brazil alleged that the United States extended price
supports and export credits to domestic cotton producers that qualified
as actionable amber light subsidies under the WTO Subsidies
Agreement.71 In September 2004, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
issued a panel report siding with Brazil.72 Most of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body’s ruling was affirmed in March 2005 by the WTO
Appellate Body.73 In August 2009, a WTO arbitration panel determined
that Brazil was entitled to impose $147.3 million in countervailing
import tariffs against United States goods.74
The Brazil WTO cotton challenge involved direct price supports and
export credits for a specific agricultural product (cotton) rather than the
indirect “input” subsidization of agricultural products in general via

65 Agreement on Subsidies pt. II (regarding prohibited subsidies and available remedies);
BENITAH, supra note 29, at 47; KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 611.
66 Agreement on Subsidies arts. 1–3, 5; BENITAH, supra note 29; KENNEDY, supra note 30, at
611.
67 Kennedy, supra note 30, at 612.
68 Agreement on Subsidies arts. 5, 7; KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 612.
69 Agreement on Subsidies art. 7; KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 612.
70 RANDY SCHNEPF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32571, BRAZIL’S WTO CASE AGAINST THE
U.S. COTTON PROGRAM 1 (2010).
71 Id. at 7–8.
72 Id. at 12–13.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 20–21. See United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton (U.S. v. Braz.),
WT/DS267/ARB/1 (Aug. 31, 2009); United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton (U.S. v. Braz.),
WT/DS267/ARB/2, (Aug. 31, 2009).
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delivery of undermarket irrigation water. However, under the WTO
Subsidies Agreement, the category of actionable subsidies appears to
include domestic subsidies that are not directly tied to such products.
Articles 1, 2 and 14 of the WTO Subsidies Agreement provides that
such domestic subsidies exist when the following conditions are
present: (i) “a financial contribution [is made] by a government or any
public body within the territory of Member” (ii) which establishes a
benefit (iii) that is specific to certain enterprises.75 Article 1 of the WTO
Subsidies Agreement then identifies four categories of “financial
contributions”: (a) a “direct transfer of funds” or “potential direct
transfers of funds or liabilities”; (b) “government revenue . . . otherwise
due [that] is foregone or not collected”; (c) government provision of
“goods or services other than general infrastructure”; [and] (d)
government purchase of goods.”76
Article I of the WTO Subsidies Agreement does not set forth a
definition of what constitutes “government revenue . . . otherwise due
[that] is foregone or not collected.”77 However, some guidance on this
question may potentially be gleaned from Article 14 of the WTO
Subsidies Agreement, which is titled Calculation of the Amount of a
Subsidy in Terms of the Benefit to the Recipient.78 More specifically,
Article 14(d) provides:
[A]ny method used by the investigating authority to calculate
the benefit to the recipient conferred pursuant to paragraph 1 of
Article 1 . . . shall be transparent and adequately explained.
Furthermore, any such method shall be consistent with the
following guidelines:79
....
(d)
the provision of goods or services or purchase of
goods by a government shall not considered as conferring a
benefit unless the provision is made for less than adequate
remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than adequate
remuneration. The adequacy of remuneration shall be
determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the
good or service in question in the country of provision or

75
76
77
78
79

Agreement on Subsidies arts. 1, 2.
Agreement on Subsidies art. 1; Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 44, at 233.
Agreement on Subsidies art. 1.1.
Agreement on Subsidies art. 14.
Id.
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purchase (including price, quality, availability, marketability,
transportation or other conditions of purchase or sale).80

Although Article 14(d) focuses on the question of “calculating” the
extent of a good provided without “adequate remuneration” rather than
on the existence of an actionable subsidy due to “foregone revenue,” its
analytic framework is potentially instructive and relevant. Article 14(d)
proposes that the amount of the monetary benefit provided by a subsidy
can be appropriately determined with reference to the “prevailing
market conditions” for the product in question in the country where the
subsidy is provided, and suggests that “price” is a fundamental aspect of
such “prevailing market conditions.”81 If a comparison to prevailing
market prices for the good in question is appropriate to determine the
benefits of a subsidy, it could be argued that such a comparison may
also be appropriate to determine whether or not government revenue is
improperly “foregone” pursuant to Article I of the WTO Subsidies
Agreement.82 Such a parallel approach seems warranted since both
inquiries hinge on the question of whether “adequate remuneration” was
provided to the government for the supplied good.
As a result of the investigation and findings of the 2004
Environmental Working Group report and the 2008 Delta Vision Task
Force report, there is substantial uncontroverted evidence to support the
claim that CVP irrigation pricing is not set at levels that enable
Reclamation to recoup its construction or operational costs, and that
such “foregone revenue” in CVP pricing provides a “good or service”
that is of benefit to California farms that receive irrigation at these
undermarket prices.83 Consistent with the approach suggested in Article
14(d) of the WTO Subsidies Agreement, this claim could be grounded
in the great disparity between Reclamation’s CVP irrigation prices and
the prevailing California marketplace for non-CVP water.84 Before
Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing is determined to be an actionable
subsidy per WTO rules, however, there are additional questions that
must be resolved.

Id.
Id.
82 Agreement on Subsidies art. 1.
83 California Water Subsidies: About the Central Valley Project, supra note 53; DELTA
VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15.
84 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15, at 42; California Water Subsidies: About the
Central Valley Project, supra note 53.
80
81
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B. Do Reclamation’s CVP Irrigation Subsidies Qualify as Foregone
Revenue?
1. Revenue Otherwise Due—Pertinent WTO Cases
Per Article 1 of the WTO Subsidies Agreement, one of the categories
of financial contributions that may qualify as an actionable domestic
subsidy is “government revenue . . . otherwise due [that] is foregone or
not collected.”85 This raises the question of whether “full cost/actual
cost” or “market” pricing of CVP irrigation water delivered by
Reclamation should be viewed as revenue “otherwise due” that has been
“forgone” based on the reduced pricing in CVP water delivery
contracts. The text of the WTO Subsidies Agreement does not provide
any further clarification of what the phrase “revenue otherwise due”
means, but previous WTO cases provide guidance on the phrase’s
potential interpretation in the context of a challenge to Reclamation’s
CVP irrigation pricing.
a. WTO Appellate Body FSC Report
In 2002 the WTO Appellate Body issued its Report in United
States—Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations (“WTO
Appellate Body FSC Report”).86 This case involved a challenge by the
European Communities against the United States policy of non-taxation
of income earned through exports by entities recognized under United
States law as Foreign Sales Corporations.87 In the WTO Appellate Body
FSC Report, the narrower and more formalist construction of “revenue
otherwise due” proposed by the United States was rejected.88 Instead,
the WTO Appellate Body held:
[U]nder Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) [of the WTO Subsidies Agreement]
a “financial contribution” does not arise simply because a
government does not raise revenue it could have raised. It is true
that, from a fiscal perspective, where a government chooses not
to tax certain income, no revenue is “due” on that income.
However, although a government might, in a sense, be said to
“forego” revenue in this situation, this alone gives no indication
as to whether the revenue foregone was “otherwise due.” In
other words, the mere fact that revenues are not “due” from a
Agreement on Subsidies art. 1.1 (emphasis added).
Appellate Body Report, United States—Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations,
WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Tax Treatment Appellate Body Report].
87 Id. ¶ 1.
88 Id. ¶¶ 105–06.
85
86
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fiscal perspective does not determine that the revenues are or are
not “otherwise due” within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii)
of the [WTO Subsidies Agreement].”
....
[T]he normative benchmark for determining whether revenue
foregone is otherwise due must allow a comparison of the fiscal
treatment of comparable income, in the hands of taxpayers in
similar situations.89

The WTO Appellate Body FSC Report generally affirmed the WTO
Panel FSC Report’s previous holding that:
To give due meaning and effect to Article 1.1 of the [WTO
Subsidies Agreement], our examination as to whether there is
revenue foregone that is “otherwise due” must be based on
actual substantive realities and not be restricted to pure
formalism.
....
[A] government could opt to bestow financial contributions in
the form of fiscal incentives simply by modulating the “outer
boundary” of its “tax jurisdiction” or by manipulating the
definition of the tax base to accommodate any “exclusion” or
“exemption” or “exception” it desired, so that there could never
be a foregoing of revenue “otherwise due.” This would have the
effect of reducing paragraph (ii) of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the
[WTO Subsidies Agreement] to “redundancy and inutility” and
cannot be the appropriate implication to draw . . . such an
approach would eviscerate the subsidies disciplines in the
[WTO Subsidies Agreement].90

To the extent the United States may attempt to counter a WTO
challenge to Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing on the grounds that
additional revenue from irrigators is not “otherwise due” because
Reclamation has not adopted policies that require the payment of such
additional revenues or because applicable Reclamation law and
regulations may prohibit such payment, this more narrow formalistic
line of reasoning would run counter to the approach endorsed by the
WTO Appellate Body FSC Report.
If the approach employed by the WTO Appellate Body FSC Report
were followed in the context of a WTO challenge to Reclamation’s
CVP irrigation pricing, the focus would be on the “substantive realities”
Id. ¶¶ 88, 90.
Panel Report, United States—Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, ¶¶ 8.37, 8.39,
WT/DS108/RW (Aug. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Tax Treatment Panel Report].
89
90
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of the CVP undermarket pricing, which would presumably employ the
approach adopted in the 2004 Environmental Working Group Report
and the 2008 Delta Vision Task Force Report.91 In the case of
Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing, the pertinent “substantive
realities” are likely to include the extent of unreimbursed Reclamation
construction/operational costs and the comparatively high cost for nonfarming parties (such as cities and the Environmental Water Account) to
acquire CVP water vis-á-vis the comparatively low cost CVP water
offered to farms.
b. WTO Appellate Body Aircraft Report
The focus on the market price for water to evaluate Reclamation’s
CVP irrigation subsidies for WTO compliance would also accord with
the approach in the WTO Appellate Body Report on Canada—
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (“WTO Appellate
Body Aircraft Report”).92 In this decision, which did not directly address
the question of “revenue otherwise due,” the WTO Appellate Body
ruled that the existence of a domestic “benefit” provided by the
government can often be determined by comparison with the
marketplace, that is, on the basis of the terms a recipient would have
received the goods or services in question on the open market.93 The
approach in the WTO Appellate Body Aircraft Report is consistent with
the method of subsidy analysis used in the 2004 Environmental
Working Group Report to evaluate Reclamation’s CVP irrigation
pricing. That is, just as in the WTO Appellate Body Aircraft Report, the
2004 Environmental Working Group report focused on pricing for the
product in question (fresh water) in the broader marketplace.
c. WTO Appellate Body Softwood Lumber Report
As discussed above, Article 14 of the WTO Subsidies Agreement,
titled Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy in Terms of the Benefit to
the Recipient, provides that a comparison with “prevailing market
conditions” can serve as an appropriate basis for determining the extent
to which the government provides goods or services to recipients
without receiving adequate remuneration.94 The interpretation of Article
91 See California Water Subsidies: Findings, supra note 19; DELTA VISION TASK FORCE,
supra note 15.
92 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999).
93 Id. ¶ 157; Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 44, at 223.
94 Agreement on Subsidies art. 14.
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14(d) of the WTO Subsidies Agreement was prominent in the 2003
WTO Appellate Body Report on United States—Final Countering Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada
(“WTO Appellate Body Softwood Lumber Report”).95 This case involved
claims that Canada was providing Canadian logging companies access
to public forests (via low “stumpage” fees for such logging) at
undermarket rates, and that such rates constituted actionable subsidies
under the WTO Subsidies Agreement.96
The WTO Appellate Body Softwood Lumber Report found:
Article 14(d) [of the WTO Subsidies Agreement] establishes
that the provision of goods by a government shall not be
considered as conferring a benefit unless the provision is made
for less than adequate remuneration. . . . Thus, a benefit is
conferred when a government provides goods to a recipient and,
in return, receives insufficient payment or compensation for
those goods.
The question then becomes how to determine whether adequate
remuneration was paid for the goods provided by the
government. This is dealt with in the second sentence of Article
14(d), which provides that “[t]he adequacy of remuneration
shall be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions
for the good or service in question in the country of
provision . . . “97
....
Although Article 14(d) does not dictate that private prices are to
be used as the exclusive benchmark in all situations, it does
emphasize by its terms that prices of similar goods sold by
private suppliers in the country of provision are the primary
benchmark that investigating authorities must use when
determining whether goods have been provided by a
government for less than adequate remuneration. . . . This
approach reflects the fact that private prices in the market of
provision will generally represent an appropriate measure of the
“adequate remuneration” for the provision of goods.98

Although confirming that prevailing market prices for the good in
question will serve as the “primary benchmark” for determining
whether a government has received adequate remuneration for a good
95 Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004).
96 Id. ¶ 48.
97 Id. ¶¶ 84–85 (emphasis in original).
98 Id. ¶ 90 (emphasis in original).
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provided, and although confirming that prevailing market prices will
“generally represent an appropriate measure” of such adequate
remuneration, the WTO Appellate Body Softwood Lumber Report
recognized that such an approach may not be appropriate in every
instance.99 More specifically, it noted that in a situation where there are
no “prevailing market conditions” for the good due to the
overwhelmingly predominant role of government in providing the
particular good, comparison to some other reference or methodology
may be warranted.100 The decision discussed potential “alternative
benchmarks” but explained that such “alternative benchmarks” were not
warranted in this instance because prevailing market conditions and
pricing served as an adequate measure. In this regard, the WTO
Appellate Body Softwood Lumber Report found:
[T]he question thus arises what alternative benchmark,
consistent with Article 14(d), could be available in such a
situation, for purposes of determining whether the goods have
been provided by the government for less than adequate
remuneration.
....
We agree with the submission of the participants and third party
participants that alternative methods for determining the
adequacy of remuneration could include . . . proxies constructed
on the basis of production costs.101

In the context of a potential WTO challenge to Reclamation’s CVP
irrigation pricing, the WTO Appellate Body Softwood Lumber Report
may be pertinent in at least two respects. First, the report confirmed that
in most situations, prevailing market prices should serve as the
benchmark for determining whether the amount paid to the government
by the recipients of the benefit of this good constituted adequate
remuneration.102 Second, the report suggested that to the extent the
government’s predominate role in providing the particular good makes a
comparison to prevailing market prices inappropriate, “production
costs” may suffice as an “alternative benchmark.”103 In the context of
Reclamation CVP water, the “production costs” of providing this water
would presumably include both the costs (in current dollars) of

Id.
Id. ¶ 101.
101 Id. ¶¶ 104–106.
102 Id.
103 Id. ¶ 105.
99

100
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d. WTO Cotton Subsidies Report
Another informative case is the 2007 WTO Compliance Panel report
in United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton (“WTO Cotton Subsidies
Report”).104 In this dispute, Brazil had alleged (among other things) that
the United States export credit program for domestically grown cotton
amounted to an actionable subsidy under the WTO Subsidies
Agreement.105 In support of this position, Brazil asked the WTO
Compliance Panel to take into consideration the minimum premium
rates (“MPRs”) provided in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development’s (“OECD”) Arrangement for Officially Supported
Export Credits (“OECD Export Credit Arrangement”) as evidentiary
support that the pricing under the United States cotton export credit
program qualified as an actionable subsidy.106 Although rejecting the
OECD Export Credit Arrangement rates as a “legally binding
benchmark” to determine whether the United States cotton export credit
rates qualified as a subsidy, the WTO Compliance Panel found that,
“from an evidentiary standpoint,” the OECD Export Credit
Arrangement rates provided an indication of whether the United States
cotton export credit rates, or GSM 102 fees, were “sufficient to cover
the long-term operating costs and losses” of the United States
program.107 As the Compliance Panel explained in the WTO Cotton
Subsidies Report:
Brazil asks us to take into consideration its comparison of GSM
102 fees with the [OECD Export Credit Arrangement] MPRs as
a “qualitative” demonstration that GSM 102 fees are well below
the level at which they should be . . .We note that the OECD
explains that the Arrangement’s benchmark rates, including
MPRs, are set “to ensure that Participants to the Arrangement
charge premium rates in addition to interest charges that . . . are
not inadequate to cover long-term operating costs and losses
associated with the provision of export credits.”108
....

104

Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/RW (Dec. 18,

2007).
105
106
107
108

Id. at 2.
Id. at 167–68.
Id. at 168.
Id.
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The MPRs may thus be regarded as representing an assessment,
developed by and agreed upon by the export credit experts of
the Participants to the Arrangement, of the premia levels that are
necessary to ensure that export credit guarantee programmes
cover their long-term operating costs and losses.109
....
We consider that, in this particular case, because of the
magnitude of the difference between the MPRs and GSM 102
fees, the MPRs may provide an indication, on an informed basis,
of the fact that the GSM 102 fees are set at a level which is
insufficient to cover the long term operating costs and losses of
the programme . . . On average, the MPRs are 106 percent
above GSM 102 fees.110

The WTO Cotton Subsidies Report did not focus specifically on the
“foregone revenue” provision of the WTO Subsidies Agreement.111
Nonetheless, the WTO Cotton Subsidies Report’s willingness to consult
outside costing standards (OECD Export Credit Arrangement rates) in
determining the existence of a subsidy may be pertinent to an evaluation
of whether Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing is WTO compliant.112
More specifically, the ruling in the WTO Cotton Subsidies Report
suggests that (in the context of a challenge under the WTO Subsidies
Agreement) valuating Reclamation’s CVP irrigation water pricing
against accepted outside standards such as cost-recovery methodology
or comparative market rates may be appropriate.
Although the WTO Appellate Body FSC Report, WTO Appellate
Body Aircraft Report, WTO Appellate Body Softwood Lumber Report
and WTO Cotton Subsidies Report collectively offer support for the
claim that Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing qualifies as foregone
revenue or inadequate remuneration under the WTO Subsidies
Agreement, it is important to note that the issue remains unsettled at
present under WTO law. Professor Marc Benitah, in his book The Law
of Subsidies under the GATT/WTO System, notes the “inherent
instability” of the “otherwise due” concept set forth in the WTO
Subsidies Agreement, and emphasizes that there may be instances
where it is difficult to identify an appropriate “universal set of
reference” against which to compare a particular domestic program to

109
110
111
112

Id. at 169.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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determine the existence or extent of an alleged subsidy.113 The costing
and water market analysis of Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing
provided by the Environmental Working Group (discussed above) might
provide the appropriate “universal set of reference” that Professor
Benitah suggests may be needed to support a “foregone revenue” WTO
claim.
Beyond the challenge of articulating a proper “benchmark” or
“universal set of reference” upon which to determine whether
Reclamation’s CVP undermarket irrigation pricing constitutes a
subsidy, a potential WTO case would also need to establish the causal
correlation between undermarket CVP irrigation pricing and the
displacement (lost market share) of products produced and sold by the
country bringing the WTO complaint.114 As Professors Richard
Steinberg and Timothy E. Josling noted in their article on the
vulnerability of United States agricultural subsidies under WTO rules,
there can often be competing or alternative causal explanations for
product displacement and lost market share that do not relate to the
pricing of products from other nations.115 For instance, there may be
fluctuations in demand and supply in certain sectors or at certain periods
of time, or distinctions in the quality and characteristics of similar
products, which suggest that below market pricing (and therefore the
subsidies that resulted in this pricing) played a fairly minimal role in
market displacement.116 A more detailed examination of the subsidydisplacement causal component is outside the scope of this article, but
for present purposes it suffices to recognize that, for a complaining
party to successfully bring a WTO claim based on undermarket CVP
irrigation pricing by Reclamation, it would need to establish that this
pricing caused them direct and significant economic injury.
2. Specificity Requirement
As noted above, one of the elements of an actionable subsidy under
the WTO Subsidies Agreement is that it must be “specific to [certain]
enterprises.”117 In the context of the CVP, the question is therefore
whether Reclamation’s undermarket pricing for irrigation to Central
Valley farms in water delivery contracts satisfies this “specificity”

113
114
115
116
117

BENITAH, supra note 29, at 188, 190.
See Steinberg & Josling, supra note 28, at 389.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 389, 391.
Agreement on Subsidies art. 2.
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requirement. Bernasconi-Osterwalder provides a useful framework for
considering the specificity element:
The question raised in the context of agricultural subsidies is
whether the specificity requirement is to be construed broadly or
narrowly. Under a broad view, any agricultural subsidy would
have to be considered specific by the mere fact that it is sectorspecific. Under a narrower approach, however, agricultural
subsidies, such as irrigation subsidies, would not necessarily
qualify as specific just because they concern one sector. In the
latter case, one could still argue that the subsidized irrigation
schemes are specific because they are limited to farmers within
a designated geographical region.118

There may be two ways in which Reclamation’s CVP irrigation
pricing contains the necessary specificity under the WTO Subsidies
Agreement. First, geographically, CVP irrigation subsidies are only
provided to California farms located in the Sacramento Valley and San
Joaquin Valley, so such subsidies seem specific in terms of the location
where such water may be delivered and used.119 Second, Reclamation’s
undermarket CVP irrigation pricing terms are specific to water used in
farm irrigation, which is to say in the agricultural sector.120 There are
different, more expensive, CVP pricing terms for municipal water and
water purchased by the Environmental Water Account for instream
fisheries.121 The CVP irrigation pricing therefore appears to be specific
to a particular economic sector (provided that agriculture/farming is
recognized as a particular sector).
3. General Infrastructure Exemption
Article 1 of the WTO Subsidies Agreement provides that the
government’s delivery of goods and services may be actionable so long
as they are not “general infrastructure.”122 Reclamation’s provision of
undermarket CVP irrigation to California farms is arguably a “service”
and presumably water constitutes a “good” given that it is an essential
Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 44, at 227.
DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15; California Water Subsidies: Executive
Summary, ENVTL. WORKING GRP. (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.ewg.org/research/californiawater-subsidies [hereinafter California Water Subsidies: Executive Summary].
120 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15, at 11, 15–16; California Water Subsidies:
About the Central Valley Project, supra note 53.
121 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15, at 11, 15–16; California Water Subsidies:
Findings, supra note 19; California Water Subsidies: About the Central Valley Project, supra
note 53.
122 Agreement on Subsidies art. 1.
118
119
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input in crop production. What remains less clear is whether
Reclamation’s delivery of CVP water for farm irrigation might properly
be characterized as “general infrastructure.”
Although the WTO Subsidies Agreement does not elaborate on what
constitutes “general infrastructure,” the 1994 WTO Agreement on
Agriculture offers some potential guidance.123 More specifically, Annex
2(g) of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture provides a list of “general
services” offered by the government that are outside the scope of
subsidy discipline provisions in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.124
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture’s definition of its “general
services” exemption might suggest the potential scope and parameters
of the WTO Subsidies Agreement’s definition of its “general
infrastructure” exemption.125 Annex 2(g) of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture provides in pertinent part:
General Services . . . Policies in this category involve
expenditures (or revenue foregone) in relation to programmes
which provide services or benefits to agriculture or the rural
community. . . . Such programmes include . . . (g) infrastructural
services, including: electricity reticulation, roads and other
means of transport, market and port facilities, water supply
facilities, dams and drainage schemes. . . . In all cases the
expenditure shall be directed to the provision or construction of
the capital works only. . . . It shall not include subsidies to
inputs or operating costs, or preferential user charges.126

When applied to Reclamation’s CVP irrigation subsidies, the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture’s Annex 2(g) definition of “general services”
does not supply a straightforward determination. On one hand, Annex
2(g)’s specific reference to “water supply facilities” and “dams”
suggests that the type of water infrastructure included in the CVP, e.g.,
dams, canals and pumps, may fall within the “general services”
exemption.127 Yet, Annex 2(g) goes on to clarify that for a government
expenditure to properly fall within the “general services” exemption, it
must be limited to “construction” costs and cannot include subsidies for
“input,” “operating costs” or “preferential user charges.”128 It is well
123 Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2(g), 1867 U.N.T.S. 410 [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture
Annex 2(g)].
124 Id.
125 See id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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established that Reclamation has provided and does provide preferential
undermarket water pricing to agricultural irrigation consumers as
compared to other non-farming users of CVP water, and the 2004
Environmental Working Group Report found that current CVP
irrigation pricing continued to subsidize “operational” and
“construction” costs.129 It also appears that irrigation water is a critical
input in the production of Central Valley crops, particularly in the more
arid San Joaquin Valley.130 These considerations suggest that, even
though the CVP contains water supply facilities and dams, there are
aspects of the undermarket irrigation pricing in Reclamation’s water
delivery contracts that place such pricing outside the Annex 2(g)
“general services” exemption.131
The extent to which the WTO Agreement on Agriculture’s Annex
2(g) exemption might serve as a guide to interpreting the WTO
Subsidies Agreement’s “general infrastructure” exemptions remains an
open question. However, if the Annex 2(g) general services exemption
is an accurate guide to how the WTO Subsidies Agreement’s
infrastructure exemption may be interpreted, then the undermarket
irrigation pricing in Reclamation’s water delivery contracts may be
outside the general infrastructure exemption and within the scope of the
WTO Subsidies Agreement.
4. Non-Farming Recipients of Reclamation’s CVP Water
To the extent the sole purpose of the CVP was to deliver irrigation to
farms for crop production, the analysis above suggests that there is a
strong basis to assert that the CVP irrigation pricing in Reclamation
water delivery contracts meets the WTO Subsidies Agreement’s
“specificity” requirement and that such pricing also falls outside the
scope of the WTO Subsidies Agreement’s “general infrastructure”
exemption. Further, the analysis suggests that there would be a credible
basis to assert that Reclamation’s undermarket CVP irrigation pricing
should be characterized as “revenue otherwise due” under the WTO
Subsidies Agreement. This line of reasoning may be complicated,
however, by the fact that the CVP has purposes beyond delivering
irrigation to private farms for crop production.132

California Water Subsidies: About the Central Valley Project, supra note 53.
Id.
131 Agreement on Agriculture Annex 2(g).
132 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15, at 19, 36; California Water Subsidies:
Findings, supra note 19.
129
130
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As noted in both the 2004 Environmental Working Group Report and
the 2008 Delta Vision Task Force Report, Reclamation also delivers
CVP water to cities for domestic municipal use (e.g., drinking water).133
The CVP’s dams, canals and pumps therefore also serve water to these
non-farming beneficiaries.134 There appears little doubt that a
government may subsidize the provision of municipal water to its
citizens for essential drinking water and health (or even provide such
municipal water free of charge to its citizens) without running afoul of
the WTO Subsidies Agreement.135 In this context, the water is not an
input to a good that is produced and could be internationally traded.
Additionally, to hold otherwise might run counter to the emerging
recognition of a right to water for basic human needs such as hydration
and sanitation.136 In the case of the CVP, the question that arises is
therefore whether the fact that Reclamation’s CVP facilities also
provide some limited water to non-farming beneficiaries somehow
places Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing beyond the reach of the
WTO Subsidies Agreement.
Based on the analysis and findings in the 2004 Environmental
Working Group Report and the 2008 Delta Vision Task Force Report,
the vast majority of Reclamation’s CVP water is delivered to Central
Valley farms for irrigation rather than to cities for municipal use.137 The
delivery of a relatively small percentage of CVP water to cities for
domestic municipal use (whose pricing may well fall outside the scope
of the WTO Subsidies Agreement) does not appear to provide adequate
legal grounds to also place Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing
outside the scope of the WTO Subsidies Agreement. In the context of
the WTO Subsidies Agreement, it is not Reclamation or the CVP as a
whole that would be challenged as an actionable subsidy. Rather, the
subject of this WTO challenge would be Reclamation’s particular
undermarket prices for irrigation for Central Valley farms in CVP water
delivery contracts.
133 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15, at 19, 36; California Water Subsidies: About
the Central Valley Project, supra note 53.
134 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15, at 19; California Water Subsidies: About the
Central Valley Project, supra note 53.
135 For recognition of the emerging right to water under international law see G.A. RES.
54/175, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/54/175 (Feb. 15, 2000); E.S.C. Res. 29/3, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003); and G.A. Res. 64/292, U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/Res/64/292 (Aug. 3 2010).
136 E.S.C. Res. 29/3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003); G.A. Res. 64/292, U.N.
GAOR, 64th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/64/292 (Aug. 3 2010).
137 DELTA VISION TASK FORCE, supra note 15, at 22; California Water Subsidies: About the
Central Valley Project, supra note 53.

288

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

[Vol. 32:259

IV. NOT JUST THE CVP—OTHER RECLAMATION PROJECTS AND PRICES
SUBJECT TO WTO RULES
Much of the preceding analysis has centered on the CVP and the
extent to which Reclamation’s CVP irrigation prices may constitute an
actionable amber light subsidy under the WTO Subsidies Agreement. It
is critical, however, to situate this CVP specific analysis in the context
of not only other Reclamation irrigation projects but also of
Reclamation’s national irrigation price policies.
A. WTO Recourse for Other Reclamation Irrigation Projects
As discussed above, in addition to the CVP, there are many other
Reclamation water projects in the arid west of the United States, such as
the Rio Grande Project in New Mexico,138 the Salt River Project in
Arizona,139 the Boulder Canyon Project on the Nevada-Arizona
Border,140 the Newlands Project in Nevada,141 and the Parker-Davis
Project in California.142 The basic methodology used in this article to
examine whether Reclamation’s prices for CVP irrigation water qualify
as an actionable WTO subsidy can be employed to examine WTO
compliance for other Reclamation projects.
For example, consider the case of Reclamation’s Newlands Project.
The Newlands Project, formerly known as the Truckee-Carson Project,
predates the CVP and its initial components were constructed from
1903–1904.143 The project delivers irrigation water to approximately
55,000 acres of Nevada cropland in the Lahontan Valley and
benchlands located in Churchill, Lyon, Storey and Washoe counties.144
In addition to alfalfa, a significant portion of the crops grown with
Newlands Project irrigation water are cereal crops, such as barley,
wheat and oats.145 Just as with the irrigation pricing for the CVP, the
138 ROBERT AUTOBEE, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, RIO GRANDE PROJECT (1994), available
at http://www.usbr.gov/projects/ImageServer?imgName=Doc_1305577076373.pdf.
139 ROBERT AUTOBEE, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, SALT RIVER PROJECT, available at
http://www.usbr.gov/projects/ImageServer?imgName=Doc_1305577664538.pdf.
140 JOE SIMONDS, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, HOOVER DAM: THE BOULDER CANYON
PROJECT (Brit Storey ed., 2009), available at http://www.usbr.gov/projects/ImageServer?imgNam
e=Doc_1262039261071.pdf.
141 JOE SIMONDS, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE NEWLANDS PROJECT (1996) [hereinafter
THE NEWLANDS PROJECT], available at http://www.usbr.gov/projects/ImageServer?imgName=
Doc_1305124117489.pdf.
142 TONI RAE LINENBERGER, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, PARKER-DAVIS PROJECT (1997),
available at http://www.usbr.gov/projects/ImageServer?imgName=Doc_1305126374732.pdf.
143 THE NEWLANDS PROJECT, supra note 141.
144 Id.
145 Id.
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price for Newlands Project irrigation deliveries is established pursuant
to long-term water service contracts with Reclamation, which in turn are
established pursuant to the regulatory pricing approach laid out in the
1902 Reclamation Act and the 1939 Reclamation Project Act (with no
interest on initial construction costs and periodic reduction in prices due
to farms “ability to pay”).
To evaluate whether Reclamation’s Newlands Project irrigation
pricing constitutes an actionable amber light subsidy under the WTO
Subsidies Agreement, the following information and determinations
would be involved: determination of the construction costs (in initial
and current dollars) for the Newlands Project infrastructure; the
Newlands Project irrigation pricing in water service contracts with
Reclamation; a comparison of Reclamation’s Newlands Project
irrigation pricing with the construction costs and ongoing O&M costs
for the Newlands Project; a comparison of Reclamation’s Newlands
Project irrigation pricing with prevailing water marketplace prices in the
area that receives water from the project; and identification of whether
there are other WTO member nations, such as those that grow and
export cereal crops like barley, wheat and oats, that are being adversely
impacted by the reduced prices charged by Nevada farms growing and
selling these same cereal crops.
The WTO compliance analysis presented in this article can therefore
be replicated for other non-CVP Reclamation irrigation projects around
the country.
B. WTO Recourse for Reclamation’s General Irrigation Pricing
Policies
As noted above, the 1902 Reclamation Act and the 1939 Reclamation
Project Act provide the broad national regulatory framework by which
Reclamation enters into project-specific supply contracts for irrigation
water. This national regulatory structure raises the question of whether,
in addition to project-specific potential WTO challenges to Reclamation
irrigation pricing, there is legal support to argue that Reclamation’s
national irrigation pricing scheme is an actionable subsidy under WTO
rules. For two reasons, it is questionable whether a broad WTO
challenge to Reclamation along these lines would succeed.
First, as discussed above, there is the hurdle of the “specificity”
requirement in Article 2 of the WTO Subsides Agreement.146 In the case
of a challenge to irrigation pricing for specific Reclamation projects,
146

Agreement on Subsidies art. 2.
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there are distinct geographic areas of farmland that receive the water,
such as California’s Central Valley in the case of the CVP or Nevada’s
Churchill, Lyon, Storey and Washoe counties in the case of the
Newlands Project. Moreover, the geographic farming region serviced by
a particular Reclamation Project often tends to focus on certain
particular crops, such as rice and cotton in the case of the CVP or cereal
crops in the case of the Newlands Project. With a WTO challenge to
Reclamation’s general nationwide irrigation pricing scheme, the
beneficiaries of such pricing are farms across the entire United States,
which grow a wide assortment of crops. A group of beneficiaries
defined so broadly in terms of geography and crop selection may not be
specific enough to fall within the scope of the pertinent WTO subsidy
rules.
Second, as also noted above, an evaluation of the existence and
extent of a Reclamation irrigation subsidy may involve a comparison of
Reclamation irrigation prices with the “prevailing” water
marketplace.147 In the case of geographically specific Reclamation
projects, the prevailing marketplace would presumably be the market
for water in the state or sub-state region where lands receiving the
Reclamation project water are located. Under a WTO challenge to
Reclamation’s general nationwide irrigation pricing, it is unclear
whether there exists a “national prevailing water marketplace.” The high
costs associated with the pumping and delivery of water means that it
can be prohibitively costly to transport water long distances, and
economic and climate variations across the country produce vastly
different prevailing water marketplaces between regions. For instance,
the prevailing per-acre foot price for irrigation water in an arid state like
Arizona would not be the same as the prevailing per-acre foot price for
a wetter state like Montana.148 The absence of a discernible prevailing
national water market could be a potential obstacle to a broad WTO
challenge to Reclamation’s general irrigation pricing policies.

Agreement on Subsidies art. 14.
According to the United States Department of Agriculture, for the year 2008 the average
cost of irrigation water in Arizona was $122.54 per acre while the average cost of irrigation water
in Montana was $14.10 per acre. Western Irrigated Agriculture: Overview, UNITED STATES
DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/western-irrigated-agriculture.aspx#.VA
KON2RdV1Q (last updated Jun. 7, 2013) (follow the hyperlink titled “Table 3-10 Average
Purchase Water Costs ($ Per Acre) for Farms Using Off-Site Surface Water by Farm Size and
State for 2008 Irrigated Farms” to download Table 3-10).
147
148
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V. CONCLUSION—WTO SUBSIDY DISCIPLINES AND THE WASTEFUL USE
OF WATER
In the United States, the debate over Reclamation’s irrigation prices
has so far played out more in the arena of politics and public policy than
the law.149 Regardless of whether the critiques of Reclamation irrigation
pricing have come from groups on the political right, such as the Cato
Institute, or groups on the political left, such as the Environmental
Working Group, the characterization of such pricing as a “subsidy” has
been used to convey the view that Reclamation’s pricing is unwise and
unjustifiable from a policy standpoint.150 These domestic critiques have
not yet alleged that there is a direct and independent legal consequence
to the designation of Reclamation’s irrigation pricing as a subsidy.
With an eye toward such direct and independent legal consequences,
this article has evaluated the potential application of the WTO Subsidies
Agreement’s foregone revenue and inadequate remuneration provisions
to Reclamation irrigation pricing, and determined that there may be a
credible legal basis for a WTO member country to allege that
Reclamation’s irrigation pricing for particular water projects qualifies as
an actionable subsidy for which countervailing measures may properly
be imposed against the United States. The WTO member country most
likely to bring such a challenge against Reclamation in the case of CVP
irrigation pricing would grow the same crops as the Central Valley
farms that receive undermarket CVP water; such a country would be
able to establish the injury necessary to support the imposition of
countervailing measures under the WTO Subsidies Agreement.151 For
example, as discussed in this article, Brazil is a producer and exporter of
cotton along with farms in California’s San Joaquin Valley that rely on
undermarket CVP water.152 The injury of a WTO member, such as
Brazil, would presumably be established by demonstrating lost marketshare to crops (e.g., cotton) produced in the United States that are less
expensive as a result of Reclamation’s undermarket CVP irrigation
pricing.
As discussed herein, this article’s mode of analysis for evaluating the
consistency of Reclamation’s CVP irrigation pricing with WTO subsidy
disciplines could also be employed to similarly evaluate WTO
149 EDWARDS & HILL, supra note 13, at 3–4, 6–7; California Water Subsidies: Executive
Summary, supra note 119.
150 EDWARDS & HILL, supra note 13, at 3; California Water Subsidies: Executive Summary,
supra note 119.
151 See Steinberg & Josling, supra note 28, at 385.
152 See supra notes 70–74, 106–114 and accompanying text.
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compliance for other non-CVP Reclamation water projects in the arid
west, such as the Rio Grande Project, the Salt River Project, the Boulder
Canyon Project, the Newlands Project and the Parker-Davis Project. For
these other Reclamation projects, the pertinent information for such an
evaluation would be the pricing of the Reclamation project irrigation
supply contracts, the shortfall between the pricing under these contracts
and actual Reclamation construction and O&M costs for the project, a
comparison of Reclamation pricing in such contracts with the pertinent
statewide or regional market prices for water, and whether there is a
competing WTO member nation whose domestic producers are being
adversely impacted by the reduced prices of United States producers
resulting from these particular Reclamation irrigation subsidies.
It is foreseeable that the United States might respond to such a WTO
challenge by noting that, under the terms of long-term water delivery
contracts, Reclamation is contractually obligated to provide irrigation at
such undermarket prices.153 The United States’ contention here might
well be correct, but the fact that Reclamation may have opted to enter
into long-term contracts with farms to provide subsidized water (or that
the United States Congress enacted laws that sanctioned such
subsidization) should not immunize such undermarket prices from being
characterized as an actionable amber light subsidy under the WTO
Subsidies Agreement. Per WTO rules, an otherwise actionable subsidy
is not rendered non-actionable merely because it is implemented
pursuant to lawful contracts between the government and the parties
receiving the subsidized benefit, or because the subsidy in question was
authorized or even mandated pursuant to lawful domestic legislation.154
Although this article has focused on Reclamation irrigation pricing in
the United States, much of the reasoning and analysis contained herein
may also be applicable to other WTO member countries that provide
undermarket water to domestic farms. Permitting recourse to WTO rules
and tribunals to address the problem of subsidized irrigation holds the
prospect not only of addressing fairness considerations between WTO
trading nations, but also of reducing wasteful irrigation practices,
shifting production towards less water intensive crops that are more
compatible with local hydrology, and discontinuing the farming of land
only marginally suitable for crop production due to poor drainage
conditions.155 These changes could make additional water available for
See Tax Treatment Appellate Body Report, supra note 86, at 669–70.
Id. at 670.
155 Richard Roos-Collins, Voluntary Conveyance of a Right to Receive a Water Supply from
the United States Bureau of Reclamation, 13 Ecology L.Q. 773, 787 n.58 (1987) (citing E.
153
154
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instream use to sustain fisheries and supplement already strained urban
water supplies.156 Equity, economic efficiency, and the fisheries sector
may therefore benefit from a determination that undermarket CVP
irrigation pricing qualifies as an actionable subsidy under WTO rules.
In his 1948 book The Thirsty Land: The Story of the Central Valley
Project, author Robert de Roos argued that California needed the CVP
to “find ways to use every drop of the available water, to allow none to
go to waste.”157 Due to Reclamation’s tiered and undermarket pricing
scheme for CVP irrigation water, however, the CVP’s effects have been
quite different from what de Roos forecast. By providing farms with
inexpensive access to extensive quantities of fresh water, Reclamation’s
CVP has itself led to wasteful irrigation practices, the planting of crops
inappropriate to the Central Valley’s climate, loss of instream flow to
sustain native fisheries, and the farming of land with unsuitable
drainage.158 As a result, there is a growing consensus that much of CVP
irrigation water is in fact wasted and that this waste comes at the
expense of urban residents’ water access and prices, local ecosystems,
and endangered species.159 The same could be said for many other
Reclamation water projects throughout the United States.
From a domestic perspective, recourse to WTO subsidy disciplines
can therefore be understood as a potential means of enlisting
international trade law to return the CVP specifically, and Reclamation
more generally, to their original intended purpose of preventing the
wasteful use of scarce freshwater resources.

HEADY ET AL., AGRICULTURAL WATER DEMANDS—FUTURE WATER AND LAND USE: EFFECTS
OF SELECTED PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL AND IRRIGATION POLICIES ON WATER DEMAND AND
LAND USE (1971)).
156 Id. at 787 n.58, 789–790, 798–800.
157 DE ROOS, supra note 3.
158 California Water Subsidies: Findings, supra note 19; EDWARDS & HILL, supra note 13;
Roos-Collins, supra note 156, at 787 n.58.
159 EDWARDS & HILL, supra note 13, at 1, 4–5; California Water Subsidies: Findings, supra
note 19; THOMAS H. WILLIAMS ET AL., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., STATUS REVIEW
UPDATE FOR PACIFIC SALMON AND STEELHEAD LISTED UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT: SOUTHWEST 1 (2011).

